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Abstract: Stratification Economics (SE) is an emergent sub-field in economics, but its JEL 
classification misrepresents its content and its relationship to the whole of economics. This paper 
first develops a more accurate characterization of SE by identifying its differences with 
Mainstream Economics (ME), its commonalities with economics in a broad sense, and how the 
combination of these differences and commonalities define it as a distinct research program. It 
then applies this definition to an economic goods taxonomy that makes a distinction between local 
public goods and common pool goods to interpret SE’S distinct research program as an economics 
of exclusion. The paper closes with a discussion of how SE might explain socioeconomic change 
in social group identity terms. 
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1. Introduction: The position of Stratification Economics within Economics 
 
Stratification Economics (SE) investigates significant and enduring disparities in income and 
wealth by social groups, particularly by race and gender, especially those associated with 
discrimination in labor and housing markets (Darity, 2005; Stewart, 2008). Income and wealth, of 
course, are categories as fundamental as any in economics, and discrimination manifests itself 
through the price mechanism, perhaps the central concern of economics. This then suggests that 
persistent differences across social groups in income and wealth that SE investigates should be a 
central topic of research in economics, and SE accordingly ought to occupy a prominent place in 
the discipline. 
 
However, particularly in regard to race there exist few locations in the economics journal literature 
where systematic disparities in economic opportunities by race and gender can be explicitly 
addressed, as William Darity recently argued in this journal (Darity, 2018). This paper discusses 
how SE has been excluded from the professional economics journal literature, tracing this to 
economics’ institutionalized system of organizing its categories and topics of investigation, the 
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classification of fields, specializations, and areas of 
research, and links this to the exclusion of the issue of race and social economic stratification from 
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mainstream economics discourse. In doing so, it aims to set out how SE differs as an economics 
approach from mainstream economics. 
 
Consider, then, where SE falls in economics’ authoritative Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) 
classification of fields, specializations, and areas of research. The JEL code places SE in 
subcategory Z13: Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic 
Stratification. The category Z under which Z13 falls is designated: Other Special Topics. In 
contrast, Microeconomics, which concerns how markets work, is listed early in the JEL code’s 
alphabetic order as category D. Macroeconomics, which concerns aggregate market performance, 
is category E. Public economics, which addresses the role of government in the economy is 
category H (still in the top half of the alphabet). The implication is clear. SE’S relegation to the 
end of the alphabet and under the ‘left-overs’ label Other Special Topics tells us that its concerns 
have little standing in the economics profession despite their traditional economic focus. Why? 
 
Surely one reason for this placement are deep, entrenched prejudices in American society that 
work to silence the investigation of systematic disparities in economic opportunities and wellbeing 
across social groups especially by race and gender. Apart from this, on a purely theoretical level 
ME’s long-standing adherence to the view that individuals are atomistically defined in terms of 
their ‘private’ preferences has served as an effective bulwark against any sort of investigation 
aimed at explaining people’s behavior and economic outcomes in terms of their social group 
locations.  Indeed, economics is somewhat unique among the social sciences in its de-emphasis on 
research on inequality.  For example, the American Sociological Association has a section on 
Racial and Ethnic Minorities and a companion journal, Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, and the 
American Political Science Association has a section on Race, Ethnicity, and Politics.  Black 
scholars are also on the editorial boards of both those fields’ major journals, though not in 
economics. 
 
In contrast, SE in fact makes individuals social group locations central to explaining their behavior 
and economic outcomes; thus, its relegation to the periphery of the profession is not surprising, 
despite its otherwise traditional concern with income, wealth, and how markets work. Indeed, its 
listing along with Economic Sociology and Economic Anthropology indicates that it is perceived 
to fall on the margins of economics, closer to other social science disciplines and their concerns 
than the purported main concerns of the profession (thus, perhaps a ‘courtesy’ to be included in 
economics and have a JEL classification at all!). 
 
If SE’s position in the economics profession, then, is at least in part a matter of fundamental 
theoretical differences regarding the nature of individuals, are there other fundamental theoretical 
differences that distinguish it from the Mainstream? At the same time, since SE is clearly still 
concerned with fundamental economic concerns, what does it share with economics in general 
(assuming economics is not reducible to ME)? Then, how does this combination of differences 
and commonalities define SE as a distinct research program?  
 
In section 2, I discuss the first question. In section 3, I discuss the second. Section 4 addresses the 
third question. Section 5 then uses the conclusions of these sections to apply the characterization 
of SE they produce to the standard goods taxonomy’s distinction between local public goods and 
common pool goods to explain SE’s distinctive approach as an economics of exclusion. Section 6 
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discusses how we might understand the connected evolution of social and market processes. 
Section 7 concludes with brief remarks on the status and future respectively of ME and SE. 
 
2. Differences between ME and SE 
 
The difference between ME and SE regarding what individuals are is an appropriate point of entry 
for identifying a larger set of differences between the two, because of what this difference implies 
regarding: (i) the subject matter of economics and (ii) the types of concepts economics should 
employ. The standard private preferences view of the atomistic individual is well known. In 
contrast, SE’s view can be labeled a social identity conception of the individual since it makes 
individuals’ social group locations fundamental, and since this is generally explained in terms of 
individuals’ identification with social groups (Darity, Mason, and Stewart, 2006).  Consider, then, 
what follows from this difference.  
 
(i) The subject matter of economics 
 
A key difference between the Mainstream and SE concerns the relationship between the economy 
and society. For ME, with its primary focus on market relationships, society is embedded in the 
economy and market relationships explain social relationships, not the reverse. For example, in 
Gary Becker’s (1957) influential analysis of discrimination in labor markets, discrimination should 
ultimately disappear because it is incompatible with competitive market forces. That is, a social 
issue can be adequately addressed by the market process. In contrast, for SE, with its primary focus 
on social relationships, and specifically intergroup inequality, the economy is embedded in society 
and social relationships explain market relationships, so that the laws or dynamics of society 
explain how the economy works, not that society is explained by how the economy works. 
Contrary to Becker’s prediction, then, we should not be surprised that discrimination in labor 
markets persists, even where markets are competitive, since discrimination is rooted in social 
prejudices that act on how markets work (cf. Darity et al., 2017, pp. 47-50). 
 
This difference does much to explain SE’s relegation to the end of the JEL code where it is 
associated with anthropology and sociology, both of which explain markets by social processes.  
It also helps explain SE’s lesser status in terms of the Mainstream’s understanding of economics 
as a distinct science with its own special characteristics. Mainstream economists generally regard 
economics as not only fundamentally different from other social sciences, but also more rigorous 
than other social sciences (cf. Lazear, 2000).1 A corollary of this view is that ME has a distinct 
conceptual apparatus that cannot be translated into the discourses of other social sciences, nor vice 
versa. Thus, underlying SE’s placement in the JEL code is the implicit assumption that SE 
misunderstands the nature of (Mainstream) economics.2 
  
(ii) The types of concepts economics should employ 
                                                             
1Lazear used these two assumptions to defend economics imperialism, essentially by applying a standard trade theory 
model to exchanges between disciplines. I discuss this and ME’s view of the relationships between economics and 
different social science disciplines at length in Davis (2016).  
2 Economics is also distinguished from other social sciences in that researchers appear more likely to subscribe to 
genetic and cultural explanations for inequality (cf. e.g., Barth et al. 2018). 
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An implication of this is that SE does not use the types of concepts appropriate to (Mainstream) 
economics.3 For example, ME explains market exchange, a kind of social interaction, strictly in 
terms of economics’ own concept of comparative advantage, and rules out not only any reference 
to the influence of the ‘non-economics’ concept of social power in explanations of how markets 
work, but also anything that might be understood as exploitation, both of which are concepts used 
to explain market exchange in other social sciences. This disciplinary restriction of economics’ 
concepts and discourse coordinates nicely with its view of the relationship between the economy 
and society, namely, that society is embedded in the economy since that embedding makes those 
‘non-economics’ concepts irrelevant. Two views, then, exist in the Mainstream regarding what 
role other social sciences might have in economics: a radical (or conservative) view that denies 
any place in economics for concepts not explained in pure market terms; a moderate (or liberal) 
view that characterizes social relationships outside of market relationships as mere ‘externalities’ 
whose main characteristic is that they may distort how markets should work.4 
 
In contrast, SE emphasizes social power and exploitation as key factors determining how some 
social groups maintain advantages in income and wealth over others. Indeed, the concept of 
stratification refers to hierarchical ordering of social groups in social and economic terms. From 
this perspective, ME’s concept of ‘externalities’ instead works to obscure the causes of differential 
market outcomes both by dismissing factors outside markets working on markets from economic 
analysis and by suggesting that as mere ‘externalities’ these factors are not even particularly 
significant.5 
 
Further, regarding the types of concepts economics should employ, not only does ME restrict the 
discourse of positive economics, it also restricts the discourse of normative economics in its 
exclusive attention to welfare and efficiency as modes of evaluation. Normative concerns such as 
justice and fairness are either ignored altogether in economic policy recommendations, or they are 
framed as a cost on the efficient operation of markets in what are termed equity-efficiency 
tradeoffs. Other normative concerns such as the value of community, individual dignity, rights of 
peoples, etc. consequently find essentially no place at all in ME. 
  
However, for SE, these normative concerns are immediate to the ethical critique of social 
stratification. Welfare is not defined in terms of efficient markets but rather in terms of a concept 
of well-being built around justice and fairness.  Table 1, then, summarizes this section’s 
conclusions in terms of five main differences between ME and SE. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
3 Joan Robinson’s economics of imperfect competition account of labor exploitation is an exception, though the 
exploitation interpretation is rarely noted in ME. 
4 For example, if a doctor personally ‘cares’ for the well-being of a patient, this constitutes an externality lying beyond 
the market transaction involved in providing health care that in principle might distort the provision of health care 
(Davis and McMaster, 2017, ch. 1). 
5 Contrast this with the view that externalities are ubiquitous since firms systematically shift and ‘externalize’ their 
costs onto society, thus imposing them on non-market agents (Kapp, 1970). Environmental costs are a classic example. 
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Table 1 
Differences between ME and SE 
 
 
Differences 
 
ME 
 
SE 
 
Individual conception 
 
Atomistic/private preferences 
 
Social group locations are 
fundamental 
 
 
Relationship between the 
economy and society 
 
Society is embedded in the 
economy 
 
The economy is embedded in 
society 
 
Economics in relation to 
other social sciences 
 
Economics is independent of 
and superior to other social 
sciences 
 
Economics is closely 
connected to other social 
sciences 
 
Economics’ concepts and 
discourse 
 
Market-related only 
 
Market and other social 
relationships are intertwined 
 
Economics’ normative scope 
 
Restricted to efficiency and 
welfare 
 
Primary attention to justice, 
fairness, community, dignity, 
rights, etc. in a broad theory 
of well-being 
 
 
 
I turn, then, to what SE shares with economics in a broad sense extending beyond the specific 
commitments of ME. 
 
3. Commonalities between economics and SE 
 
SE is clearly concerned with fundamental economic issues, and thus despite the differences listed 
above also shares certain commonalities with economics in general. I distinguish two kinds of 
commonalities: (i) shared conceptual structures and (ii) shared modes of economic reasoning. 
 
(i) Shared conceptual structures 
 
SE’s fundamental concern with the enduring character of disparities in income and wealth by 
social groups and by race and gender tells us that it employs equilibrium-type concept as a means 
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of explaining how the economy continually gravitates to identifiable patterns of interaction. The 
Black-White wage differential, for example, is not an occasional manifestation of how markets 
work, but rather the product of persistent forces that continually to drive markets to this result. 
Similarly, housing discrimination is not a phenomenon lacking any clear pattern over time, but 
rather a well-identified outcome constantly and repeatedly produced across all sorts of housing 
markets. 
 
I will argue in the next section that, given its differences from ME discussed above, how SE uses 
the concept of equilibrium is quite different from how the concept is used in ME. Here, I simply 
say that the concept refers to the tendency of the economy to settle into identifiable relationships 
which can be investigated in terms of underlying forces – a general meaning that does not specify 
the types of relationships involved.  In equilibrium theory, then, this gravitation to identifiable 
relationships is especially explained in terms of their stability. Stable relationships are not just ones 
an economy gravitates to from time to time but ones that if disturbed the economy tends to gravitate 
back to. That is, equilibrium states are not temporarily settled states of affairs, but states of affairs 
that have long-term persistence. 
 
This indeed describes the enduring long-term character of disparities in income and wealth by 
social groups and by race and gender that SE investigates. The underlying social forces that drive 
these outcomes are long-term social factors in the sense that they are deeply rooted in history, and 
are largely independent of changing patterns of economic development and changes in social 
policies regarding the economy. 
 
Note, then, that while other social sciences also investigate settled relationships, they do not 
generally use the language of equilibrium and stability to do so. The term ‘equilibrium’ is used 
commonly in natural science, and economics has taken it over from there, perhaps because 
economic relationships have long been seen to be law-like on the model of scientific laws in the 
natural sciences. However, SE’s concern with enduring relationships in the economy does not 
require that these relationships be thought to be laws or law-like. I also return to this issue below. 
 
(ii) Shared modes of economic reasoning 
 
My claim in this case is that SE’s commitment to the idea that the economy exhibits gravitation to 
stable equilibrium-like situations leads it to employ a sort of reasoning regarding how the world 
should be explained methodologically that economists generally employ. 
 
Consider, then, how the world is thought to work when explained in equilibrium terms. Equilibria 
exist, but they can also break down due to ‘disturbances’ associated with unexpected, irregular 
forces acting upon them. Such forces are conventionally termed ‘shocks’ in economics to 
emphasize their unexpected, irregular character. When we think in terms of economic models 
formulated in terms of specific, identifiable economic relationships, ‘shocks’ are factors treated as 
exogenous relative to the endogenous relationships operating within the model. 
 
However, since the world constantly gravitates to equilibria, shocks must still be transient events 
that are accordingly followed by gravitation to new equilibria. The method of analysis economists 
then employ is an episode-based type of analysis framed as a specific sequence: 
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                                          [equilibrium – shock – new equilibrium] 
  
The original equilibrium and the new equilibrium are linked by the shock, so a continuity exists 
between them, but the character and source of this link means that original equilibrium does not 
fully determine and explain the new equilibrium. That is, how the world changes over time depends 
centrally on the nature of the shock, where it comes from and what its nature is. 
 
I will argue in the next section that SE’s interpretation of the nature and role of shocks as the link 
in this sequence is important to explaining the character of its distinct research program, but close 
this section with a summary of its claims in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2 
Commonalities between economics and SE 
 
Commonalities Form of economic reasoning 
 
Conceptual structures 
 
Equilibria acted on by external 
forces 
 
Method of analysis 
 
[equilibrium – shock – new 
equilibrium] model of analysis 
 
 
 
 
4. SE as a distinct research program: A complex systems interpretation 
 
My view, then, is that what makes SE a distinct research program is how it combines the ways in 
which it differs from ME and its commonalities with economics in general. I frame the discussion 
here in terms of commonalities, and then look at their distinctive interpretation, given SE’s 
differences from ME. Drawing on Table 2 on commonalities, then, there are then two ways I 
explain SE’s distinct research program: (i) in terms of shared conceptual structures; specifically, 
how equilibrium and stability are understood in SE; (ii) in terms of shared modes of economic 
reasoning; specifically, how the [equilibrium – shock – new equilibrium] model of analysis is 
employed in SE. 
 
(i) SE’s interpretation of shared conceptual structures – equilibrium and stability 
 
I argued that SE employs an equilibrium-type concept and uses the idea that equilibria tend to be 
stable. In section 2, however, I argued that fundamental to SE is the view that the economy is 
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embedded in society, not, as ME has it, that society is embedded in the economy. What, then, does 
the SE equilibrium concept in fact apply to? 
 
According to William Darity: 
 
Stratification economics examines the structural and intentional processes generating 
hierarchy and, correspondingly, income and wealth inequality between ascriptively 
distinguished groups (2005, p. 144).  
 
What the equilibrium concept applies to, then, is the hierarchical relationship between ascriptively 
distinguished social groups, specifically as distinguished by race and gender. That is, what the 
economy continually gravitates toward is a whole array of stable unequal relations in income and 
wealth across social groups. Markets accordingly adjust to these ‘social group equilibrium’ states 
rather than the Mainstream view that social relationships adjust to market equilibria. As its name 
indicates, SE is about social stratification, so its use of an equilibrium-type concept, accordingly, 
is  its means of explaining how the economy continually reproduces stable hierarchical orderings 
of social strata by groups.6 
 
Darity also emphasizes that SE investigates how “Intergenerational transmission effects load 
heavily on the transfer of material resources across generations” (Ibid.). That stratification across 
social groups operates intergenerationally in determining the movement of material resources from 
one generation to the next means that social group equilibria are stable and enduring in the long 
term. Should events or social policy then disturb a given social group equilibrium, we should 
nonetheless expect society and the economy to gravitate to another. 
 
There is an interesting difference, however, between how SE understands stability and how ME 
understands it. ME sees equilibria as being produced by symmetrical supply and demand forces, 
since both sides of the market are determined by the behavior of atomistic individuals, and in a 
general equilibrium world all markets affect all markets. This means that should external forces 
displace an equilibrium, the new equilibrium in the market is no more likely to rise or decline in 
value. Whether prices go up or down cannot be determined since shocks that disturb equilibria are 
by nature unexpected and irregular. 
 
For SE, however, social group equilibria are hierarchical, so not only do societies continually 
gravitate to social group orderings, but they also gravitate to overall structures of orderings with 
different social groups continually positioned on different social economic levels vis-à-vis one 
another. This tells us something about the way in which the equilibria involved are stable. It is not 
the case that a given social group is equally likely to see its relative status rise or decline following 
events – e.g., social movements, political turmoil, natural disasters – disturbing some existing 
social group equilibrium that is then followed by some new social group equilibrium.  
 
Instead, social equilibria are hierarchical and continually order social groups vis-à-vis one another 
means that events disturbing existing states of affair are more likely to adjust social group 
relationships to advantage higher ranked social groups and to disadvantage of lower ranked social 
                                                             
6 Here is worth adding that the term ‘equilibrium’ as used here obviously does not mean ‘desirable’ despite Mainstream 
economists’ tendency to sometimes conflate the two. 
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groups. That is, equilibria are not symmetrically stable, but involve biased adjustment upwards for 
advantaged groups and downward for disadvantaged groups. For example, the 2007-2008 financial 
crises upset an existing social group equilibrium, and was followed by another in which the 
position of white men was significantly enhanced and the position of black women was 
significantly worsened (Arestis et al., 2014). Thus, the stable character of social group equilibria 
reflects the overall structures of orderings with different social groups. 
 
(ii) SE’s interpretation of shared modes of economic reasoning – an expanded equilibrium-shock 
model of analysis 
 
The [equilibrium – shock – new equilibrium] model employed in economics is built around the 
equilibrium concept, and shocks in the Mainstream are regarded as idiosyncratic, unexplainable 
events relative to the logic of equilibrium determination. However, SE is not a market-centric sort 
of theory but instead a social relations-centric sort of theory, and thus its focus is on what lies 
outside the market and ultimately drives the market process. Accordingly reducing social processes 
to shocks not only distorts thinking about those processes by characterizing them as idiosyncratic 
and unexplainable, but also discourages investigation of what drives economic outcomes. How, 
then, do SE economists interpret the Mainstream understanding of the equilibrium-shock model? 
 
Darity’s entry point for answering this question is how Mainstream economists are likely to look 
upon persistent differences in economic success and well-being between individuals in advantaged 
and disadvantaged social groups. Since these differences cannot be explained by market processes, 
a natural explanation for the Mainstream economist, he argues, is to ascribe those differences to 
the behavior of the disadvantaged social groups themselves – an ascription that then functions as 
“an ideological mask” concealing a society organized hierarchically across advantaged and 
disadvantaged social groups.  For the stratification economist, claims about the defectiveness of a 
group with outcast/caste status are an ideological mask that absolves the social system and 
privileged groups from criticism for their role in perpetuating the condition of the dispossessed 
(Darity, 2005, 144). 
 
The Mainstream idea that market equilibria are disturbed by idiosyncratic shocks consequently 
suppresses the investigation and understanding of social forces that ultimately underlie and drive 
market processes by concealing their underlying determinants. For SE, the way markets work 
depends on what is systematically elided from economic analysis, leaving a socially benign 
supply-and-demand account as all that economics is about. 
 
SE’s interpretation of the [equilibrium – shock – new equilibrium] model consequently aims at 
replacing the shock idea by analysis of how changes in hierarchical social group relationships 
cause disruption and adjustment in market processes. Though it oversimplifies, call these 
disruptions ‘social shocks.’ Then, since SE shares economics’ equilibrium reasoning, the new 
equilibria that emerge after these shocks not only settle market processes but also social processes.  
Or, the overall equilibrium state of affairs needs to obtain in both sorts of processes, given that 
they are connected and interact. 
 
This multi-level or multi-process mode of reasoning is one often used in Complexity Economics 
 10 
where relatively distinct processes interact and some are nested in others – here with market 
processes nested in social processes. Entire multi-process systems are treated as ‘self-organizing’ 
(Simon, 1962), and their analysis involves identifying and explaining relationships between 
different processes that cause their overall evolution. The difference, then, between the 
noncomplex, single-process Mainstream view and an SE complex system multi-process view can 
be set out schematically as follows. 
 
Suppose that the market process is explained in Mainstream supply-and-demand terms. We might 
think here, for example, of labor markets where the combined effects of choices on both sides of 
the market mean that altogether atomistic agents’ actions a have wage determination effects b.  
Causally speaking, then, there exists a direct relationship between a and b: 
 
                                                                    a -> b [1]  
 
If we ignore for the moment how social processes affect markets and simply think of changes in 
markets as only being caused by idiosyncratic shocks, then new equilibria succeed such shocks as 
in the standard mode of reasoning, and the same market model is then continually reproduced. In 
short, the a -> b relation acts on itself through a reflexive feedback channel – reflexive in the sense 
that it feeds back upon itself – and makes the market model a complete, self-reinforcing 
explanation of the world: 
 
                                                          a -> b -> (a -> b) [2] 
 
Then, the overall causal effects, (=>), of the direct relationship [1] and the reflexive feedback 
channel [2] produces both b, the wage determination result, and (a -> b), the self-reinforcing 
conception of the labor market: 
 
                          a and a -> b and a -> b -> (a -> b) => b and (a -> b) [3] 
 
That is, since a -> b and (a -> b) exhibit the same direct effect of a on b, the reflexive feedback 
channel demonstrates that the market model provides a complete explanation of the world. 
Contrast this with SE’s view of the world in which social processes are not idiosyncratic but 
influence market processes. In terms of the same example, suppose the relationship between a and 
b involves wage discrimination, and that this is disputed and resisted by those who are victims of 
it – a social process independent of the market process that acts upon it. 
 
Agents’ actions a then still have direct effects on b, since labor markets continue to work in terms 
of supply-and-demand mechanics. However, since the effects of social processes now can 
influence the relationship between a and b, the market model no longer provides a complete 
explanation of the world. Therefore, the feedback channel does not simply reproduce the original 
relationship between a and b in a self-reinforcing way, so that [2] is now replaced as follows: 
 
                                                   a -> b -> (a -> b)’ [4] 
 
The combined relation [3] is accordingly replaced as follows: 
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                          a and a -> b and a -> b -> (a -> b)’ => b and (a -> b)’ [5] 
 
The effects b in supply-and-demand terms of agents’ actions a still occur, but the relationship 
between a and b has changed because the market process is nested in a social process, namely, that 
wage discrimination is disputed and resisted, which determines its functioning. In complex 
systems terms, the market model not only fails to provide a complete explanation of the world, but 
it ignores how different processes interact in multi-process systems – here where change in markets 
is determined by social processes that occur outside them and acts upon them. Yet so long as “an 
ideological mask” concealing social processes acting on markets remains in place, the market 
process vision of the world in [3] prevails.  Table 3 summarizes the results of this section. 
 
Table 3 
SE as a distinct research program 
 
 
Focus of comparison 
 
ME 
 
SE 
 
Conceptual structures 
 
Symmetric, socially benign 
supply and demand equilibria 
 
Asymmetric, hierarchical 
social group equilibria 
 
Method of analysis 
 
Idiosyncratic shocks and a 
single process conception 
 
Social ‘shocks’ and a multi-
process conception 
 
 
 
This account leaves two matters unexamined. First, it says very little about the social processes in 
[4] that are associated with persistent differences between social groups by race and gender in 
market economies, or about how they may have transformative effects on market processes. 
Indeed, in a multi-level, multi-process analysis, we begin to see the limitations of reasoning in 
terms of ‘shocks’ as set out in this section, since this limits what gets said about social processes. 
 
To make this analysis more meaningful, then, the next section lays out a framework for integrating 
social processes with market processes. To do so, it compares SE and ME in terms of how they 
address the effects of social processes on market processes, and by treating SE as an economics of 
exclusion. 
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Second, [5] not only tells us that  markets do not simply reproduce themselves in a self-reinforcing 
way, given the interaction between social and economic processes, but it also suggests that market 
processes may evolve in virtue of how social processes operate upon them. The section following 
the next thus turns to the issue of how they might evolve together. 
 
5. SE as an economics of exclusion 
 
The complex systems interpretation of SE in the last section, combined with ME’s “ideological 
mask,” implies that SE’s distinctive research program examines the interaction between social and 
market processes which ME conceals. SE, then, is first and foremost an ‘economics of exclusion’ 
in that it constitutes a response to ME’s exclusion of social processes from economic analysis: it 
investigates what ME excludes from economics, namely, the influence of social processes on 
market processes. Yet, SE is also an economics of exclusion in that it investigates how that 
exclusion operates, or how ME’s “ideological mask” restricts attention to market processes at the 
expense of providing a full account of how the market economies work hierarchically. 
 
I offer one way of addressing these two dimensions of exclusion by comparing how SE and ME 
approach the traditional taxonomy of goods. In the standard goods taxonomy, different types of 
goods are classified according to two characteristics: whether their consumption is rivalrous and 
whether it is excludable. Rivalrousness is a matter of whether one person’s consumption precludes 
another’s. Excludability is a matter of whether people’s access to goods can be limited.  Combining 
these two characteristics produces four different types of goods: private goods, public goods, local 
public goods (or club goods5), and common pool resource goods (see Table 4). 
 
 
Table 4 
Standard taxonomy of goods 
 
  
Excludable 
 
Non-Excludable 
 
Rivalrous 
 
Private goods 
 
Common pool resource goods 
 
Non-rivalrous 
 
Club goods 
 
Public goods 
 
 
 
(i) What is excluded from economics: SE on club goods and common pool resource goods 
 
I argue that SE focuses on southwest-northeast diagonal in Table 4, and sees the distinction 
between club goods and common pool resource goods as broadly reflective of how social processes 
determine market processes in hierarchical societies through a whole variety of social restrictions. 
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Club goods, then, are the product of membership rules extended to a limited number of people. 
Access to such goods is fully excludable and non-rivalrous so long as membership is limited. Once 
in the club, a person has unlimited, exclusive access to what the club provides, while those not in 
the club have no access to the goods the club provides. Indeed, for those not in the club, the 
opposite case is common pool resource goods.  Common pool resource goods exist where secure 
property rights are absent and government regulation is ineffective or non-existent. Their 
consumption is rivalrous and access is nonexcludable, so that they are often over-used depleting 
their resource base in tragedy of the commons type scenarios. 
 
For SE, society’s hierarchical organization by social groups, where some groups are socially and 
economically advantaged and other groups are socially and economically disadvantaged, replicates 
the distinction between these two types of goods. Belonging to a social group is equivalent to being 
a member of that group, so hierarchical social orders work according to social group membership. 
Advantaged social groups enjoy membership in exclusive club-like social arrangements that allow 
higher levels of consumption (and real income), while disadvantaged social groups are restricted 
from being members in those social arrangements, and accordingly are left with lower levels of 
consumption (and real income).  
 
If we see the social arrangements involved as deeply rooted in social prejudice and long-standing 
maintenance of the rules that limit access to privileged club-like economic institutions, then this 
distinction provides a solid basis for explaining how “Intergenerational transmission effects load 
heavily on the transfer of material resources across generations” (Darity 2005, p. 144). 
 
The club goods idea, then, can be used to explain discrimination in social terms since 
discrimination is central to maintaining restrictive access for some social groups. Human capital 
based theories of wage differentials use purported differences in skills to explain restricted access, 
but a club goods interpretation makes social prejudice a fundamental determinant of restricted 
access.  
 
At the same time, the idea that disadvantaged social groups are left to compete over free access 
common pool resource goods well describes the trap-like conditions people face when excluded 
from club-like opportunities. For example, housing markets in poor inner urban areas place higher 
burdens on socially disadvantaged individuals than housing markets in better off urban areas 
(Desmond, 2016). 
 
Consider now how ME avoids making social group hierarchy a part of economics. 
 
 
(ii) How ME’s “ideological mask” works: Private goods and public goods 
 
I argue, then, that ME emphasizes the northwest-southeast diagonal in Table 4, and assumes that 
the economy can be fully explained in market process terms alone by focusing simply on the 
distinction between private goods and public goods. Of course, the production and provision of 
private and public goods depend on social processes, respectively, private property rights and 
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government. How, then, does ME proceed as if market processes work independently of social 
processes?  
 
In principle, private property rights and government provision of public goods extend to all people 
in a society. Thus, the social processes they depend on do not distinguish higher ranked social 
groups and lower ranked social groups, whereas the social processes generating club goods clearly 
do so. Thus, focusing on private and public goods alone makes it appear that market processes 
work independently of social processes.7 
 
At the same time, ME needs to de-emphasize the role played by club goods and common pool 
resource type goods in the economy. Evidence for this lies in the JEL code, where club goods fall 
under State and Local Government, the next-to-last sub-category (H7) under public goods (falling 
just before Miscellaneous Issues), implying they concern a specialized topic not central to the 
overall category of public goods (whose primary focus is national governments). Thus, the socially 
restrictive character of many local communities, where zoning and disguised red-lining practices 
favor socially advantaged groups in a club-like way, is represented as a minor topic. Alternatively, 
club goods can be investigated under Externalities and Redistributive Effects (H23). 
 
The idea that restrictive effects of club goods are ‘externalities’ itself implies that they are side 
effects of market processes, and thus not central to the overall explanation of market processes. 
Common pool resource goods have even a lesser status in the JEL code. Their investigation 
generally falls under category Q: Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental 
and Ecological Economics, significantly down in the JEL alphabetical order, and they are typically 
investigated in relation to environmental problems and not the social conditions of urban 
communities.  
 
However, disadvantaged urban communities often suffer the same sort of problem investigated in 
environmental economics, namely, their populations’ competition for their limited resources 
undermines their precarious resource base. Schools, public safety, food stores, transportation, etc. 
are shared resources in limited supply and thus subject to over-use that further erodes them.  
 
Despite the fact, then, that the common pool resource problem clearly affects disadvantaged 
communities, ME rarely generalizes the common pool resource problem to include differences in 
types of communities. Indeed, to do so would make obvious that resource quality systematically 
varies across communities, thus demonstrating that communities can be differentiated 
hierarchically by advantage and disadvantage, and therefore that market outcomes are determined 
by social processes.  
 
The argument in this section, then, differentiates SE and ME according to the latter’s control of 
what economics is supposed to be about, especially as institutionally legitimated in the official 
JEL taxonomic classification system for economics. That system influences economists’ research 
priorities, economics education, and the formulation of social policy in such a way as to suppress 
                                                             
7 I emphasize appearance here to capture the ME an ‘as if’ strategy. Clearly, however, private property rights and 
government provision of public goods do not extend to all people equally in practice as, for example, the realities 
policing and court systems in hierarchical societies well demonstrate. 
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investigation and thinking about how social group hierarchy is perpetuated and reinforced by 
market processes. 
 
However, for SE, market processes are embedded in social ones, and so (as indicated by [5] in the 
last section) markets do not simply reproduce themselves independently of social processes; rather, 
social processes determine whether markets work to perpetuate social hierarchies. Thus, how 
social processes evolve in relation to market ones deserves discussion to fully account for the 
distinctive research program of SE. This is the subject of the following section. 
 
6. SE on the evolution of social and market processes 
 
Though SE uses an [equilibrium – shock – new equilibrium] model of analysis, we saw that shocks 
are social shocks, not the sorts of idiosyncratic disturbances that ME with its exclusive attention 
to market processes assumes, and as such constitute the effects of social processes on markets. At 
the same time, though SE is concerned with enduring relationships in the economy, it is not 
committed to the idea that they reflect laws or are law-like relationships, as ME implies with its 
natural science vision of the economy.  
 
For SE, how the economy evolves over time is determined by how social relationships evolve over 
time. I suggest, then, that for SE, with its foundations in social group identity theory, there are two, 
opposing types of determinants that explain the evolution of social relationships. The first derives 
from standard social group identity theory. In that theory, individuals’ own social group locations 
serve as reference points that frame their behavior. Specifically, individuals act in ways that favor 
other in-group individuals and disfavor out-group individuals (Tajfel et al., 1971). In political 
terms, people form alliances with members of their own social groups against people in other social 
groups.  I characterize this type of political alliance as in-group politics. 
 
The second determinant derives from a refinement in social identity theory associated with 
explaining circumstances in which people identify with multiple social groups – termed 
intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1989; cf. reference blinded) – such that their behavior can favor one 
set of in-group individuals in one situation and another set in another situation. For example, a 
person might identify with others by race or by gender depending on the situation. In political 
terms, people can form alliances with social groups they are members of against social groups 
which they are also members of.  
 
In effect, people have one foot happily in one group and their other foot unhappily in another. This 
complicates political alliances, but it also creates opportunities that do not exist in simpler in-group 
versus out-group circumstances, since the divided individual with multiple identifications remains 
a member of groups that may be in opposition, and thus acts potentially as a bridge between them. 
I characterize the types of political alliance that this involves as cross-group politics (cf. Davis 
2015). 
 
If we look back, then, to the formal analysis in section 4, note that [2] and [3] describe a closed, 
self-reinforcing world in which existing relationships perpetuate themselves. Standard social 
group identity theory fits this analysis because an in-group versus out-group situation sustains 
itself. In contrast, [4] and [5] describe circumstances in which the world is open and evolves in 
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that existing relationships do not perpetuate themselves. Intersectionality social group identity 
theory fits this analysis because cross-group politics hold the potential for transforming existing 
relationships.  
 
The world we actually live in, of course, is the intersectional one – standard social group identity 
theory being only an initial theoretical framework that has undergone refinement. Thus, we live in 
a world in which social relationships can evolve, despite the strong forces producing social 
stratification, when social processes act to change market relationships that maintain social 
stratification. Here I explain those social processes in a very elementary way in terms of political 
and social group identities, and do not explain any particular types of change. The important 
conclusion here, then, is the SE, because it sees the economy as embedded in society, possesses 
the capacity for explaining this potentially changeable world. ME lacks this capacity, and indeed 
in assuming society is embedded in the economy works to secure a socially stratified world. 
 
7. Concluding comments regarding the future of SE 
 
ME’s dismissal of SE and other non-conforming economic approaches is clearly costly to them. 
Yet it may be costlier to ME, since it leaves Mainstream economists with the unchallenged view 
that social processes are reducible to and fully explained by market processes. I trust that the idea 
that society is fully explainable by the economy is so implausible once reasonably considered  that 
the risk to ME of its self-isolation and insulation from dissident approaches will be apparent. The 
prospects for SE, however, are in principle quite positive. On the one hand, it is hard to deny that 
the most fundamental social economic issues facing people in the world today are rising 
inequalities and the disparate opportunities and well-being by race and gender. These issues must 
be addressed if human society is to prosper, and SE provides a framework in which this can be 
done. The goal of this paper, then, was to try to contribute to further articulating what this 
framework involves on the grounds that this articulation may increase its influence and progress. 
On the other hand, SE, as rooted in social group identity theory, provides a concrete framework in 
which these fundamental contemporary issues can be addressed. What is especially powerful about 
this framework is that it shows how social processes can be determinative of market processes 
through understanding the politics of social groups. One of the tasks of this paper was thus to link 
social group identity theory with politics so as to show what social and market processes’ evolution 
depends upon in terms of how people confront social stratification. 
 
This paper has left out of consideration one very important social domain that should be integrated 
into the characterization of SE and into any analysis of change in society and the economy: ethics 
and values as a basis for the politics of social economic policy. I leave this to future discussion. 
 
 
 
Conflict of interest statement 
 
No conflict of interest exists between the author and any financial or personal relationships with 
third parties whose interests could be positively or negatively influenced by the article’s content. 
 
 
 17 
References 
 
Arestis, Philip, Aurelie Charles, and Giuseppe Fontana (2014) “Identity Economics Meets 
Financialisation: Gender, Race, and Occupational Stratification in the US Labour Market,” 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 38 (6): 1471-1491. 
 
Barth, Daniel, Nicholas W. Papageorge, and Kevin Thom (2018) “Genetic Endowments and 
Wealth Inequality,” NBER Working Paper No. 24642, Cambridge: MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Becker, Gary (1957) The Economics of Discrimination, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Buchanan, James (1965) “An Economic Theory of Clubs,” Economica 32 (125): 1-14. 
 
Crenshaw, Kimberlé (1989) “Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: a black feminist 
critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics,” University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 129: 139–67. 
 
Darity, William A., Jr. (2018) “Foreword,” Journal of Economics, Race, and Policy 1: 1. 
 
Darity, William A., Jr. (2005) “Stratification Economics: The Role of Intergroup Inequality,” 
Journal of Economics and Finance 29 (2): 144-153. 
 
Darity, William A. Jr., Patrick Mason, and James Stewart (2006) “The economics of identity: 
The origin and persistence of racial identity norms,” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 60: 283-305. 
 
Darity, Jr., William A. Jr., Darrick Hamilton, Patrick L. Mason, Gregory N. Price, Alberto 
Davila, Marie T. Mora, and Sue K. Stockly (2017) “Stratification Economics: A General Theory 
of Intergroup Inequality,” in Andrea Flynn, Susan Homberg, Dorian Warren, and Felicia Wong 
(eds.), The Hidden Rules of Race, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 35-51. 
Davis, John (2016) “Economics Imperialism versus Multidisciplinarity,” History of Economic 
Ideas 24 (3): 77-94.  
Davis, John (2015) “Stratification economics and identity economics,” Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 39 (5): 12-15-1229. 
Davis, John and Robert McMaster (2017) Health Care Economics, London: Routledge. 
Desmond, Matthew (2016) Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City, New York: Crown. 
Kapp, K. William (1970) “Environmental Disruption: General Issues and Methodological 
Problems,” Social Science Information 9 (4): 15-32. 
Lazear, Edward (2000) “Economics Imperialism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (1): 99- 
146. 
 
 18 
Simon, Herbert (1962) “The Architecture of Complexity,” Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society 106 (6): 467-482. 
 
Stewart, James (2008) “Stratification economics,” International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences, Farmington Hills: Cengage. 
 
Tajfel, H., Billig, M., Bundy, R. and Flament, C. (1971) “Social categorization and intergroup 
behavior,” European Journal of Social Psychology 1: 149–78. 
